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BOOK REVIEW
TAKING THE PEOPLE SERIOUSLY
Lackland H. Bloom, Jr.t
THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION.

By Joseph Goldstein. Oxford Univer-

sity Press. 1992. 22 pp. $22.95.
The subtitle of Professor Goldstein's timely and important book
is "The Supreme Court's Obligation to Maintain the Constitution as
Something We the People Can Understand." Essentially, Professor
Goldstein contends that the Court must explain its constitutional decisions in a manner that is comprehensible to the public because continuing public consent is the true source of the Court's legitimacy and
authority.' Professor Goldstein analyzes several relatively recent and
significant Supreme Court opinions to illustrate how the Court has
frequently neglected this responsibility. He concludes by offering a
short set of canons of opinion writing which, if heeded, would improve the Court's performance.
Influenced by Professor Robert Nagel's trenchant analysis of the
Court's increasing inability to explain its decisions in a comprehensible manner, 2 and my having previously addressed the issue 3 by contrasting the Court's famous flag salute opinion 4 with one of its more
recent flag burning cases,5 I must admit great sympathy toward Professor Goldstein's thesis. Like Professor Goldstein, I believe that the
Court is obliged to make a serious effort to ensure popular understanding of, and at least the possibility of consent to, its decisions and
decisionmaking process. Further, I agree with Professor Goldstein
that improving the clarity of the Court's opinions should generally not
t

Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Law School.
1 JOSEPH GOLDSTmIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION 4-7, 19-20 (1992).
2 Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1985), substantially
republished in ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CuLTuRES: THE MENr.ALrY AND
CONSEQUENCES OFJUDICIAL REVIEW

(1989).

3 Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Barnette andJohnson: A Tale of Two Opinions, 75 IoWA L.
REv. 417 (1990). See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an EducativeInstitution ,
67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 961, 977-85 (1992) for a different analysis of the rhetoric of these cases.
4 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). JusticeJackson's
opinion for the Court in Barnetteis a classic example ofjudicia rhetoric at its best. It is one

of the unusual Supreme Court opinions that can responsibly be considered law as literature. Barnettewas actually the second flag salute case in that it reversed the Court's prior
decision in Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
5 Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:885

affect case outcomes. 6 However, in certain instances in which I am
skeptical about his application of his canons to specific cases, I wonder
whether his criticisms of the opinions are not more related to disagreement with the Court's substantive principles than with its
rhetoric.
Professor Goldstein begins by quoting ChiefJustice Marshall's famous admonition in McCulloch v. Maryland: " [w] e must never forget
that it is a constitutionwe are expounding."7 Professor Goldstein notes
that in developing this theme, Marshall emphasized that since a constitution draws its authority from the people and is intended to endure, constitutions are written, and must be interpreted, in a manner
designed to retain flexibility.8 Marshall pointed out that the simplicity
of language in the Constitution helps to promote these goals. 9 Just as
it was crucial that the Constitution be written in both a language and a
style that the public could comprehend, so must Supreme Court opinions "expounding" the Constitution pass a test of public accessibility if
they are to ensure an understanding which will facilitate continuing
consent. 10 In that regard,*Professor Goldstein cautions that the Court
must not simply explain its reasoning clearly, but must also "strive to
maintain the character of the instrument" by avoiding "convert[ing] it
into a detailed body of rules and regulations."" He argues that the
McCulloch opinion itself is a splendid example of how the Constitution
should be expounded, because the decision rests on intelligible "constitutional principles of general application" fashioned to maintain
12
the broad constitutional outlines.
It is certainly not necessary to return to the early days of the
Court to discover opinions deliberately written in a style comprehensible to the ordinary citizen. Many of the significant decisions of the
twentieth century readily qualify, including Powell v. Alabama,'3 West
Virginia State Board ofEducation v. Barnette,14 Brown v. Board of Education

See GoLsT in, supra note 1, at 19, 128-30.
7 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original). Justice Frankfurter referred to this statement as "the single most important utterance in the literature of constitutional law." Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and theJudicial Function, 69 HARv. L. REv.
217, 219 (1955).
8 GOLDSTEN, supra note 1, at 4.
9 Id. at 5 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404-06).
10
GoULsTi , supra note 1, at 7-8.
6

11

Id. at 8.

12
13

Id. at 12.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).

14

319 U.S. 624 (1943). See generally Bloom, supra note 3 (contrasting this opinion
v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).

with Texas
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(I),15 School District of Abington v. Schempp,' 6 Gideon v. Wainwright,'7
Mapp v. Ohio,18 Katz v. United States,19 and even Griswold v. Connecticut. 20 Until relatively recently, the Court regularly delivered opinions
in major cases that were written in ordinary language, relatively uncluttered with citations, quotations and cross-references, that purported to deliver a single opinion of the Court joined without
qualification by a clear majority. In other words, a person without
legal training could read and understand these opinions.
Unfortunately, that has often not been the case for the last two or
three decades. Supreme Court opinions in even the most important
and interesting cases have grown technical, tedious, argumentative
and fragmented. 21 Regardless of whether this decline in intelligibility
is attributable to the increased reliance on law clerks, the rhetorical
skills of the justices, changes in the legal and political culture, the
complexity of the issues or the increased caseload, it is certainly a matter of great concern.
Professor Goldstein aptly uses the Court's decision in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services22 to illustrate the contemporary Court's explanatory deficiencies. 23 Like so many other recent Supreme Court
opinions, Webster easily fails the test of intelligibility. It is composed of
ajumble of overlapping concurrences and dissents, making it difficult
for any but the most careful reader to discern which principles are
supported by a majority of the justices. 24 Furthermore, he criticizes
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See Thomas M. Mengler, Public Relationsin the Supreme Court:
Justice Tom Clark's Opinion in the School PrayerCase, 6 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 331 (1989) (arguing thatJustice Clark deliberately wrote an accessible opinion to build public support for
the school prayer decisions).
17 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
18 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21 See generallyNAGEL, supranote 2, at 129-31, 139-42, 154-55 (arguing that the Court's
15

overly analytical writing style distances it from its audience); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS
TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLmcAL DiscouRsE 92-101, 153-58 (1991) (stating that
the Court's rights-based adversarial approach to opinion writing deprives the reading public of a full exposition of thejudicial decision-making process); Bloom, supra note 3, at 42329 (arguing that most Supreme Court opinions address an audience of lawyers and scholars); Eisgruber, supra note 3, at 1002 (saying that the Court's oratory has become "technical, spare and reductive"); Peter Huber, Advice to Justice Thomas, FORBES, Nov. 25, 1991, at
202. Cf Paul M. Barrett, If there is Blood in an Opinion, We Know Who Wrote 14 WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 4, 1993, at Al (discussing the role of law clerks in Supreme Court opinion writing).

22

492 U.S. 490 (1989).

23

GOLDSTEn, supra note 1, at 13-19.

24 Id. at 17. Professor Goldstein quotes from the Court's increasingly familiar introductory paragraph, which purports to explain which justices join in the various portions of
the opinion. In the book's Foreword, Professor Burke Marshall presents a similar critique
of the analogous introductory paragraph in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
The Court's recent decision in the cigarette advertising federal preemption case, Cipol-
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Justice Rehnquist for attacking Rods overly particularistic trimester
framework as if that superstructure was dictated by the underlying
25
constitutional principle of privacy.
Central to Professor Goldstein's thesis is the belief that the true
source of the Court's legitimacy is continuing popular consent. As he
notes, the significance of popular consent to constitutional government itself, and derivatively to judicial review, played a crucial role in
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland. Marshall there echoed a
theme previously developed in the Federalist Papers 26 which in a
more general form can be traced back to Locke. 27 Many scholars have
emphasized the significance of popular consent, including Professor
Goldstein's colleagues at Yale, the late Alexander Bickel 28 and Charles
Black.29 As Professor Bickel once put it:
Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the beginnings of conversations between the Court and the people and
their representatives. They are never, at the start, conversations between equals. The Court has an edge, because it initiates things
with some immediate action, even if limited. But conversations they
are, and to say that the Supreme Court lays down the law of the land
is to state the ultimate result, following upon a complex series of
events, in some cases, and in others it is a form of speech only. The
effectiveness of the judgment universalized depends on consent and
30
administration.
This was ultimately a crucial aspect of Bickel's reconciliation of
the tension between the counter-majoritarian force of judicial review
and popular democracy. Likewise, the court has just recently emphasized the role of popular consent in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey.3 ' In a
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 499 U.S. 935 (1992) is another stunning example of the fractured and complicated opinion.
25 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 17-18.
26 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-68 (Alexander Hamilton); No. 49, at 313-14
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
27 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREA-nsES OF GovRNmEr 366-67 (1690) (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
28 SeeALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 27-28 (1962) [hereinafter
BICKEL, BRANCH] ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
90-95 (1970) [hereinafter BICKEL, PROGRESS];ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MoRALrly OF CONSENT 15-16, 107-11 (1975) [hereinafter BICKEL, CONSENT].
29 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 34-55 (1960). Others connected with Yale and the Yale Law School have also emphasized the role of the Court in
legitimating government action. See, e.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34-35 (1935);JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 37 (1930); Robert A. Dahli,
Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker,6J. PUB. L. 279,
294 (1957).
SO BICKEL, PROGRESS, supra note 28, at 91. See also Barry Friedman, Dialogue andJudicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 599 (1993) (explaining that the Court, while having final
authority, must still write its decisions for a public audience).
31 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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key paragraph discussing the need to honor precedent, the Court
explained:
The Court's power lies.., in its legitimacy, a product of substance
and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the
Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to
declare what it demands....
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for
them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court's
legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under
circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently
32
plausible to be accepted by the Nation.
This may be the most explicit statement the Court has ever offered to explain why it is obligated to write decisions in a comprehensible and principled manner, and it reads as if drawn straight from
The Intelligible Constitution. The Court rarely troubles itself to directly address matters of judicial review theory. That it chose these
grounds to defend one of its most crucial and controversial contemporary decisions emphasizes the importance of Professor Goldstein's
central premise.
The extent of actual public knowledge and approval of the
Supreme Court and its decisions is a matter of academic dispute.
Some studies have shown that at least at a diffuse level, significant
popular approval of and consent to the Court and judicial review is a
reality.3 3 As the authors of several important studies have concluded,
"despite serious misgivings about individual decisions.., the general
public as well as the elites were generally pleased with the way the
Court was performing its overall functions."34 Others argue that the
data indicates public disapproval of the Court.35 Moreover, studies
32 Id. at 2814. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately
rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.").
33 See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBUC OPINION AND THE SuPREmE COURT (1989);
Gregory Caldeira, Neither the PurseNor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme
Court, 80 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 1209, 1210, 1224 (1986); Walter F. Murphy & Joseph
Tanenhaus, Publicity,Public Opinion, and the Cour, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 985, 994-1004 (1990)
[hereinafter Murphy & Tanenhaus, Publicity]; Walter F. Murphy &Joseph Tanenhaus, ExplainingDiffuse Support for the United States Supreme Court: An Assessment of Four Models, 49
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1037 (1974); Walter F. Murphy &Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion
and the United States Supreme Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisitesfor Court Legitimation of Re.
gime Changes, 2 LAw & Soc'v Ruv. 357, 370-80 (1968).
34 Murphy & Tanenhaus, Publicity,supra note 33, at 998.
35 See, e.g., David Adamany &Joel B. Grossman, Supportfor the Supreme Court as a NationalPolicymaker,5 LAw & PoL'Y Q. 405, 408 (1983); Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation
in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 379, 409.
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often show that public knowledge of the Supreme Court and its decisions is quite limited.3 6 Whatever the reality, considering that in theory legitimation through popular consent is and always has been well
accepted as a cornerstone of judicial review and democratic government, the Court should take its obligation to address the public seriously, even if the average citizen fails to take advantage of the
opportunity to evaluate the Court and its product. At the very least,
the Court should attempt to explain its decisions to the educated, but
not necessarily legally trained elite, to whom it must look for the core
37
of its public support.
Although Professor Goldstein makes no such distinction, I would
suggest that, as a practical matter, the degree to which the Court
should render its opinions intelligible to the lay audience should vary
somewhat with the nature of the issues. In cases of obvious interest
and significance to the public, such as those involving the constitutionality of abortion regulation, public support or restriction of religious activity, affirmative action plans, and police conduct or
restrictions on speech, the Court should make every effort to explain
its decisions in a manner that the non-lawyer can understand. While
the Court should always attempt to write clearly and concisely, I would
afford it somewhat more leeway to be technical and legalistic in opinions adjudicating the latest nuances of constitutional doctrine in areas
such as state taxation of interstate commerce, Eleventh Amendment
based state immunity or the intricacies of Article III jurisdiction.
The core of The Intelligible Constitution is a four chapter segment critiquing the Court's opinions in National League of Cities v.
Useiy3 and Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority,3 9 Cooper
v. Aaron,40 Brown v. Board of Education 141 and J42 and Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.43 In these four chapters Professor
36
See, e.g., MA siALL, supra note 33, at 143; David Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning
Elections, and the Supreme Cour4 1973 Wis. L. REv. 790, 810; Stephen M. Griffin, What is
ConstitutionalTheoy? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned Tradition, 62 S. CAL. L.
REv. 493, 522 (1989); Hyde, supra note 35, at 407; Murphy & Tanenhaus, Publicity, supra
note 33, at 996; Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 LAW & Soc'y REv. 427, 438-39 (1977).
37
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 114. See, e.g., Adamany & Grossman, supra note 35,
at 429-30 (Court derives support from liberal political activists); Nelson W. Polsby, Public
Opinion Is Led, 84 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1031 (1990) (arguing that the public tends to support the
Court because the professional elite does not attack it); Eisgruber, supranote 3, at 1009-10
(explaining that the Court's opinions when read by law students can influence public
opinion).
38
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
39
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
40
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
41 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
43 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Goldstein attempts to show how the contemporary Supreme Court has
failed to expound the Constitution in a sufficiently comprehensible
way.
In "With Studied Ambiguity," the chapter on National League of
Cities and Garcia,Professor Goldstein argues that the Court failed in its
obligation to ensure that the opinion "means what it communicates,"
because Justice Blackmun's short and essential concurrence endorsing an ad hoc balancing approach seemed inconsistent with Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court propounding a much more rigid
framework of analysis. 44 Indeed, as Professor Goldstein suggests, perhaps the NationalLeague of Cities principle never really existed, in that
the crucial fifth vote was never truly committed to the core of the
45
Rehnquist opinion.
Professor Goldstein argues thatJustices Rehnquist and Blackmun
were quite obviously aware of the lack of consistency in their respective approaches and that they should have confronted the issue and
hammered out some greater agreement of principle before representing that the Rehnquist opinion actually spoke for a majority of the
justices.46 To the extent that agreement could not be achieved, Professor Goldstein argues that it would have been preferable for Justice
Rehnquist to publish his views as a clearly delineated plurality opinion
with no pretense of speaking for the Court.4 7 That approach would
have avoided deceiving the reader into believing that the Court had
taken a major step for which it did not quite have the votes.
The uninitiated reader would probably have failed to recognize
the extent to whichJustice Blackmun's concurrence limited the scope
and indeed the precedential force of the Rehnquist opinion. To the
seasoned reader of the Court's product, Justice Blackmun's understanding that the Court was applying a balancing test seemed puzzlingly inconsistent with the more rigid approach of the Rehnquist
opinion. The Court's subsequent cases in the area confirmed thatJustice Blackmun was not disposed to interpret the NationalLeague of Cities principle in the same manner as Chief Justice Rehnquist and its
other supporters. 48 However, at the time that NationalLeague of Cities
was decided, quite possibly both Justice Rehnquist and Justice Black44

GoL sTmN, supra note 1, at 26-30.

Id. at 30, 32, 35.
Id. at 29-35.
47 Id. at 32.
48
In the three major federalism/state sovereignty cases decided between National
League of Cities and Garcia, E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) and F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742 (1982),Justice Blackmun voted with the majority to uphold the federal regulation
against state challenge in all three cases. The Hodel decision was unanimous. There were
sharp dissents in the other two cases.
45
46
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mun believed that they could resolve their differences in subsequent
cases and over time produce a workable approach for the Court. If so,
they both may have believed that future stability was better served by
attempting to start out with a majority holding in need of some reworking, than to invalidate an important piece of federal legislation
on the basis of a plurality and a somewhat inconsistent special concurrence. After all, the Court did have a case to decide and there did
appear to be five votes in support of some degree of state immunity.
The Court's obligation to develop a body of coherent and justifiable precedent is important but its obligation to decide the actual disputes before it as best it can is arguably even more important and
certainly more pressing. Had Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun been
unable to agree on the proper analytical approach and had Justice
Blackmun persisted in believing that the legislation in question was
inconsistent with principles of federalism, the Court would have been
justly criticized for deciding a significant issue without a majority opinion to provide guidance.
The alternative, declining to make significant changes in the law
unless a clear majority opinion could be developed, would hopefully
render the Court's work product more comprehensible by decreasing
the number of plurality opinions. Ideally, such an approach would
serve as a disciplining mechanism by forcing concurring justices to
work out their differences before publishing their opinions, an option
Professor Goldstein obviously prefers. Leaving aside the difficulty of
persuading the Court to adopt such a rule in the first instance, it is
likely that in many cases the justices would be unable to resolve their
analytical disagreements. In those instances, the justices would either
revert to filing separate opinions or more disturbingly decide the case
against their best judgment as to the appropriate outcome. The latter
would be especially unfortunate. It is certainly not obvious that it
would be preferable for the Court to decide cases incorrectly rather
than unclearly. Furthermore, although it would be desirable if the
Court could produce clear, coherent and principled rationales for its
decisions in the cases in which an issue is initially presented, that may
simply be too much to expect.
In deriving principles from a very general charter through the
incremental case method, there will be many instances, as with common law adjudication, in which the appropriate principle can only be
developed through trial and error as the line of precedent unfolds. 49
Often, the disjointed approaches of concurring and plurality opinions
will ultimately contribute to the development of a stabilizing princi-

49

Professor Goldstein acknowledges this. GoLDSrN, supra note 1, at 118.
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pie. From this perspective, there would be costs as well as benefits
from insisting that the Court proceed by clear majority only.
If any of the opinions in NationalLeague of Cities should be faulted
from a rhetorical standpoint, it is surely Justice Brennan's. On a substantive level, he ably presented the case against a judicially enforced
state sovereignty principle. Nevertheless, his overheated condemnation of the majority decision and his exaggeration of its significance is
all but unprecedented. 50 If ever an opinion violated Professor Goldstein's canon that a justice should "be accurate and scrupulously fair
in making attributions to another opinion in the case,"51 it is the
Brennan dissent in National League of Cities. The difficulties for the lay
reader in separating hyperbole from justifiable disagreement in a dissent on a relatively complex legal issue are obvious. The justices
would advance public understanding and diminish the potential for
creating disrespect for the Court as an institution by resisting the urge
to attack decisions with which they strongly disagree in such shrill and
bombastic language.
Turning to the overruling of National League of Cities in Garcia,
Professor Goldstein scolds Justices Rehnquist, Powell and O'Connor
for writing dissenting opinions vowing to fight to resurrect state immunity instead of quietly surrendering to the new majority.5 2 In perhaps the least persuasive segment of his book, Goldstein argues that
because of the unworkability of National League of Cities, respect for
stare decisis requires allegiance to Garcia rather than to National
53
League itself
To assert that the Garciadissenters failed to properly honor stare
decisis when it was -the majority who discarded a significant and relatively recent precedent sorely tempts one to cry "Astounding," "Incredulous," echoing Justice Brennan's National League of Cities
50 During the course of his dissent, Justice Brennan characterized the majority opinion or its principles or reasoning as "patent usurpation"; a "manufactured... abstraction
without substance"; "an abstraction having such profoundly pernicious consequences";
"must astound scholars"; "ill-conceived abstraction can only be regarded as a transparent
cover for invalidating a congressional judgment with which they disagree"; "an ipse dixit
reflecting nothing but displeasure with a congressional judgment"; "the paucity of legal
reasoning"; "by fiat"; "sophistry"; "absurd"; "patently is in derogation of the sovereign
power of the Nation"; "no principle given meaningful content"; "devoid of meaningful
content"; "could operate as a fiat"; "the portent of such a sweeping holding is so ominous
for our constitutional jurisprudence as to leave one incredulous"; "more alarming is the
startling restructuring of our federal system"; "ominous implications"; "violates the fundamental tenet of our federalism"; "disregard for precedents"; "cavalier treatment"; "no analysis"; "conceptually unworkable"; "a catastrophic judicial body blow"; "an ominous portent
of disruption of our constitutional structure implicit in today's mischievous decision." 426
U.S. at 856-80 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
51
GOLOsrN ,supra note 1, at 119.
52
Meat 38-41.
53
Id.at 36-41.

894
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rhetoric. 54 Professor Goldstein argues that his call for an intelligible
constitution does not assume a particular ideological bias and I accept
that as largely true. Nevertheless, I wonder whether in this instance
the widely shared academic distaste for National League of Cities has
influenced Goldstein's application of his analysis. 55 For a precedent
that broke new ground, nine years seems like a very short period in
which to determine that it could not be applied consistently. The case
can certainly be made, as Professor Van Alstyne has argued, that if the
National League of Cities test didn't work, it was because a hostile federal judiciary, particularly at the Supreme Court level, undermined it
from the outset. 56 Thus with the active support of the NationalLeague
of Cities dissenters, Justice Blackmun's critique of that decision's unworkability soon became a self-fulfilling prophecy. As a general rule,
precedent, even in constitutional law, should be accorded great
weight in order to ensure stability, predictability, neutrality and principled decisionmaking. 5 7 Consequently, perhaps Garcia should be accepted as the final word on this subject although the implications of
the recent opinion in New York v. United States suggest that this may
not be so. 58 Still, stare decisis seems to be a peculiarly inappropriate
argument clincher in this particular context given that both the Garcia
majority and dissents have built their positions on disregard of recent
precedent. 59 As a result, perhaps this is an instance in which ulti54

As Professor Goldstein notes, the majority in National League of Cities overruled

Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). GOLDSTEn, supra note 1, at 26 citing 426 U.S. at
845. The successive opinions in Maryland v. Wirt; NationalLeague of Cities and Garciaindicate the general instability in the law that existed when the Fair Labor Standards Act was
extended to the states. It would not seem appropriate to attach too much weight to stare
decisis in this area at least until the Court had an adequate opportunity to work through
the issues in a series of cases. Whether the Court had done that by the time of Garciais a
debatable question.
55
The overwhelming amount of academic commentary on National League of Cities
was highly critical. See, e.g., Dean Alfange, Jr., Congressional Regulation of the "States Qua
States". From National League of Cities to EEOC v. Wyoming, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 215; Sotirios A. Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery New Meaningfor the Tenth Amendment?,
1976 Sup. CT. Rnv. 161; Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, The Demise of a MisguidedDoctrine, 99 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe,
UnravelingNational League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential
Government Services, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1065 (1977).
56 William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death ofFederalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709, 1717
(1985).
57
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 709 (1992); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. Rnv. 723 (1988).
58 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). There, in the course of invalidating an attempt by Congress
to "commandeer" state government for the purpose of carrying out federal regulation, the
Court purported to distinguish Garciaon the ground that the legislation at issue was applicable to private parties and the states alike. Id. at 2420. Justice White argued persuasively
in dissent that this distinction was of little significance. Id. at 2441-44 (White, J., dissenting). IfJustice White's argument is taken seriously in the future, it could provide a basis
for reconsidering Garcia.
59 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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mately getting it right, if that is possible, should prevail over the normally sound considerations of stare decisis.
In the chapter entitled "Had Understanding Been the Goal," Professor Goldstein addresses the Court's unanimous opinion in Cooperv.
Aaron.60 Here, Professor Goldstein focuses on Justice Brennan's apparently deliberate substitution throughout the opinion of the word
"desegregation" for the term "integration," which had been used by
the lower court in its decree.6 1 In an interview, Justice Brennan had
stated that he had made that substitution after having been informed
that the term desegregation would be considered less inflammatory in
the South since it apparently suggested a mere cessation of legally
mandated segregation rather than an affirmative mixing of the
races. 62 Professor Goldstein criticizes the Court (or at least Justice
Brennan) for deliberately attempting to obscure the meaning of the
decision and indeed the lower court's mandate. 63 In this instance,
Professor Goldstein's commitment to intelligibility arguably leads to a
"damn the torpedoes full speed ahead" approach to constitutional
decisionmaking. Apparently, he believes that the Court is obliged to
announce its principles clearly and firmly with no concern for
whether they can be enforced. He decries the Cooper Court for attempting "to play prophet and politician."64 In an ideal world, this
might be a desirable model for the Court. In the real and very complicated world in which the Court operates, however, such an approach
seems romantic, naive and, most significantly, a threat to the ultimate
realization of constitutional rule.
Presumably, Professor Goldstein believes that the Court acts legitimately only when it acts in a principled manner; that once it begins
to temper principle with considerations of expedience, even in an effort to achieve principled results in the long term, it undermines its
own credibility and authority. Again, from an idealistic standpoint,
there is much to admire in such an uncompromising stance. Theoretically, under such an approach, the Court would draw strength from
its unwillingness to flinch. Indeed that seems to be the thesis of the
joint opinion in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey quoted earlier. 65 Hopefully, the public and the executive branch would rally to the aid of an
institution that carried out its obligation of constitutional exposition
so heroically.

60

61
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65

GoLDsTEIN, supra note 1, at 43-55 (discussing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
Id. at 47-55.
Id. at 48-50.
Id. at 52-55.
d. at 53.
See supranote 32 and accompanying text.
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And yet Cooper v. Aaron, as much as any decision the Court has
ever rendered, was written in a context in which the Court must have
entertained doubts as to whether either significant segments of the
public or the other branches of the government were prepared to
stand behind its mandate. I find it hard to fault the Court for being
somewhat manipulative at a time when guile may have appeared to be
one of the few weapons in its arsenal that it could call on to advance
the constitutional principles set forth in Brown.
There are, however, at least two possible responses to my apology
for Justice Brennan's deviousness. As suggested above, one might
conclude that if the Court simply states its principles clearly without
pulling its punches, resistance will be less significant than if it proceeds in a more Machiavellian manner. In the long run, the Court's
mandates probably will be accepted even when presented bluntly. In
the short run however, which may entail many years, I believe it is
unduly optimistic to assume that resistance will simply dissipate when
confronted with clearly stated principle, especially when those who
disagree strongly believe that their own understanding of the Constitution is correct.
Alternatively, one could maintain that it is the constitutional role
of the executive to see that the Court's mandate is enforced and as
such, the Court should not undermine its own function in an effort to
perform another institution's job. This is a principled position, admirable for its rigor. Executive failure to enforce the Court's mandates,
however, could undermine the Court's power and authority by making it appear impotent. As a matter of institutional self-protection, the
justices have almost certainly considered the prospect of inadequate
executive support since at least Marbury.66 It would be hard to imag-

ine justices as politically sensitive as John Marshall, Felix Frankfurter,
Earl Warren, William Brennan and William Rehnquist doing otherwise. I do not fault the Court for behaving in such a politically conscious manner, at least in the extreme case. Clarity, candor, and even
principle, in the short run, can be carried to counterproductive
extremes.
In the following chapter, "Decisions Unexplained," Professor
Goldstein examines the opinions in Brown v. Board of Education, with
primary emphasis on the Court's consideration of the appropriate approach to the remedial issue in Brown II. Professor Goldstein argues
66 See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 39-44 (1960). In a
television interview with Bill Moyers, Justice Powell confided that when United States v.
Nixon was before the Supreme Court, the justices worried about the possibility of Presidential defiance. Justice Powell quipped that they considered what would happen if the Court
were to send its fifty security guards up against the best infantry in the world in an effort to
enforce its mandate. Moyers in Search of the Constitution, Conversation with Associate Justice
Lewis Powell (PBS television broadcast, June 1987 (tape on file with author)).
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that in Brown 1, the Court concluded that some amount of delay in
desegregation would have to be tolerated. It neglected, however, its
obligation to explain why any public interest in accommodating the
problems faced by the southern school districts could override the private and public interests in ensuring that the victorious plaintiffs in
the cases received immediate vindication of their rights to attend integrated public schools.6 7- Goldstein seems to be more troubled by the
substance than the style of Brown 11, although one could certainly
maintain that if there is no underlying principle to the decision, it can
hardly be stated intelligibly.
Of course the probable explanation for the Court's decision was
its belief that gradualism was necessary to both obtain compliance and
avoid violence and to accommodate legitimate administrative burdens.68 Professor Goldstein acknowledges that these were unavoidable considerations, but argues that the Court was under an obligation
to explain clearly in its opinion its concern about violence and enforceability rather than leave it as a shadowy sub-text. 69 He notes however that he would not actually expect the Court to openly
acknowledge these matters since it would be embarrassing to rely on
such unprincipled considerations." Hence his position seems to be
"if you can't say it, then don't do it."
As with his objections to Cooper v. Aaron, this approach seems dangerously naive. Clearly Professor Goldstein is correct that the Court
would be unlikely to explicitly note that its gradualist approach to
remediation was in part attributable to its fear of resistance. Its reticence, however, would be driven as much by concern that such an
admission would further embolden the opponents of Brown as by embarrassment. It is easy enough in retrospect to argue that the Court
could and should have taken a more principled approach in Brown
IF' by ordering immediate desegregation of the schools before the
Court. 72 But it is not at all apparent that the mandate would have
been heeded. The Court decided Brown during a decade in which
integration was opposed with police dogs, fire hoses, billy clubs, mass
arrests, fire bombings and murders. While one school of thought
maintains that the resistance and violence would not have been so
67
68

GOLmsrEIN, supra note 1, at 76-80.
bC URD KLUGER, SimPLEJusrncE 742-46 (1977); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF

118-25 (1983); Philip Elman (interviewed by Norman Silber), The Solicitor General's Office,
Justice Frankfurter,and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An OralHistory, 100 HArv. L. REv.
817, 827-30 (1987).
69 GoLmSEm, supra note 1, at 78.
70 Id. at 79.
71 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
72 Chief Justice Warren apparently came to believe that "all deliberate speed" was a
serious error. SCmvARTZ, supra note 68, at 123-24.
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great had the Court simply issued a "principled" decision requiring
immediate compliance, 7 3 it is certainly possible that the resistance and
violence would have been even greater had the Court taken that approach.7 4 While we can never know with certainty, I would maintain
that the Court would have been irresponsible not to consider such
consequences in the course of making its decision.
The ambiguity of Brown 1 may very well reflect the Court's understandable inability to forecast the nature and the scope of potential
resistance, administrative burden and judicial competence. Brown 11
after all is the source of modem structural reform litigation. Over the
past forty years the potential and the limitations of this approach have
been made apparent. 75 For these reasons, the approach remains a
matter of great controversy. While clarity, certainty, coherence and
unwavering principle are obviously desirable, it may be unrealistic to
expect that the Court can attain these ideals as it sails in turbulent and
uncharted waters.
Moreover, the historical evidence suggests that, for at least some
of the justices, the remedial gradualism of Brown 1 was an absolute
prerequisite to their decision to join Brown 's invalidation of segregated schooling. 76 Had the Court felt obligated to order immediate
desegregation as the only principled remedy, it may have forfeited the
unanimity which it deemed so crucial to enforcement. It is not obvious that strict adherence to principle would have been worth the risks
posed by a divided Court. Faced with these considerations, the gradualist approach of Brown I may have been the best that could be expected under the circumstances. While the Court may be faulted for
failing to develop the meaning of Brown adequately over the next fifteen years, the Brown decisions themselves remain heroic efforts in the
context of their day.
Before turning away from the Brown decisions, I should note that
in many respects, they are among the stronger contemporary examples of Supreme Court decisions written in a style that is relatively
73 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3,
22 (1970); Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation,67 Mic-I. L. Ray. 237, 244
(1968). Professor Goldstein cites a recent speech in whichJustice Stevens made the same
point. GouDSmI, supra note 1, at 80.
74 J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 68 (1979).
75 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE (1991); Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Cour4 96 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982); Abram Chayes,
The Role of theJudge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Robert F. Nagel,
Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1978).
76 See Elman, supra note 68, at 828; Mark Tushnet, What Really Happened in Brown v.
Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1928-30 (1991) (describing how Frankfurter
required gradualism to convince himself that Brown Iwas correct); DennisJ. Hutchinson,
Unanimity and Desegregation:Decisionmakingin the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEo. LJ. 1,
39 (1979).
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accessible to the layperson. Granted, they are not perfect examples of
legal craftsmanship. Brown I obviously overemphasizes the significance of education to the underlying principle of the case. Nor does
it clearly explain why the Court takes racial discrimination so seriously. And perhaps it relies too heavily on social science data.7 7 As
Professor Goldstein argues, Brown II does not adequately explain why
the constitutional rights of the school children should be sacrificed in
the (very long) interim.
The weakness of the decisions as a matter of legal reasoning may
be somewhat attributable to one of their greatest strengths-their peculiarly public oriented nature. Both of the Brown opinions were
short, largely devoid of legal jargon and fairly straightforward in their
explanation. Apparently, the Court concluded that it was more important to appeal to (and hopefully convince) the lay person, especially the open-minded southerner, than the law professor. 78 Perhaps
the Court would have produced a less equivocal opinion had it focused primarily on its traditional professional audience rather than
the general public. Brown was a case, however, in which the Court
understood that its legitimacy as an institution would be challenged
and tested. As Professor Goldstein recognizes, the public is the ultimate arbiter of whether the Court has passed the test. Obviously,
cases such as Brown are the exception rather than the rule. Rarely is
so much at stake. Still, I would argue that the style of opinions that
the Court produced in the Brown decisions is an admirable one. They
provide a far better model than the typical legalistic, quarrelsome,
fractionalized, citation-laden product that has become all too common recently.
In the final case study, Professor Goldstein chastises the Court,
and especially Justices Brennan and Powell, for "Failing to Take Their
79
Own and Each Other's Opinions Seriously" in the Bakke opinion.
He focuses on the paragraph injustice Brennan's opinion in which he
purports to state, but in fact significantly overstates, "the central meaning" of the Court's opinion, which in itself required a combination of
the Powell opinion with the divergent plurality opinions of Justices
Brennan and Stevens.8 0 Professor Goldstein notes that although there
was indeed internal discussion between the justices regarding the ac77 See, e.g., Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence,30 N.Y.U. L REv. 150 (1955).
78 Professor Goldstein notes that ChiefJustice Warren had explained to the members
of the Court that "'opinions should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical,
unemotional and, above all non-accusatory.'" GoLDSTiN, supra note 1, at 58 (quoting
DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN PoLIcs 281 (1986)).
Professor Eisgruber argues that the Court in Brown ignored educative concerns in its opinion in order to avoid fueling the fires of resistance. Eisgruber, supra note 3, at 1020-28.
79 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 81.
80 IM at 89-90.
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curacy of Brennan's summary, it did not lead to meaningful alteration
of the paragraph.8 ' He argues that the opinion as published was misleading in that the Brennan summary misrepresented the holding of
the Court and that the justices should have continued to confer until
they agreed either to drop the summary entirely or to rewrite it to
accurately reflect the Court's holding.8 2 This point is well taken, at
least as long as the focus is on intelligibility to the lay reader. Certainly, those of us who read Supreme Court opinions for a living immediately recognized thatJustice Brennan was engaging in the sort of
overreaching rhetoric that has become quite common on the Court.
As such, the statement was easily discounted. Likewise, virtually every
time the Court decides an abortion case, the justices quarrel vigorously about whether it preserves Roe or effectively overrules it.83 The
academic community does not take these broadsides seriously and I
am not certain that the public does either, given that the press generally provides an adequate summary of the conflicting positions. Nevertheless, the justices should attempt to decrease the amount of
manipulative and disingenuous rhetoric that they presently employ.
Some readers may be confused by the misleading claims that the justices frequently make, and even if they are not, these misstatements
certainly do not enhance the prestige of the Court.
The book's final chapter outlines Professor Goldstein's prescription for change. In order to render constitutional opinions more intelligible, he urges the Court to adopt and apply five canons of
comprehensibility. He suggests that the justices hold a conference after the drafting but prior to the release of opinions, to ensure that
these canons have been observed.8 4 He concludes the book by suggesting how these canons might have been applied in a final review of
each of his five case studies.8 5 Canon One calls for the Court to "[u]se

81 Id. at 92-97. Professor Goldstein quotes from memoranda published by Bernard
Schwartz in his book BEHIND BAKKE: AmrnMATrE AcrnoN AND THE SUPREME COURT 13840

(1988).
82
83

GoLDsT'rN, supra note 1, at 97.
See, e.g., Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2819-21 (1992) (opinion of

O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., & Souter, J.) (replacing the trimester framework with undue
burden analysis but purporting to preserve the core of Roe); Id at 2843, 2853. (Blackmun,
J., concurring and dissenting) (Court's approach does not protect the woman and protect
the competing interests as well as the strict scrutiny trimester approach of Roe); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 518-21 (1989) (Rehnquist, CJ.) (replacing tri-

mester framework with undue burden analysis but purporting not to reconsider the validity of Roe); Id. at 532. (ScaliaJ.) (joining the Rehnquist opinion on the belief that it does
effectively overrule Roe despite its disclaimer to the contrary); Id. at 537, 538. (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (Roe could not survive the plurality's analysis).
84 GoLDsIN, supra note 1, at 125.

85

Id. at 126-28.
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simple and precise language 'level to the understanding of all.' "86
This is without doubt the most important step that the Court must
take to ensure that its opinions are accessible to the public. It is hard
to overstate how incomprehensible the Court's work product has become in recent years. The average Supreme Court opinion, especially
in cases of significant public interest, is written in a technical language
of legal tests and standards which can mean little, if anything, to the
uninitiated. The opinions tend to be littered with string citations,
needless quotations from earlier cases and lengthy and quarrelsome
footnotes.8 7 They often read as though they were specifically
designed to intimidate all but the most determined readers.
An obvious response to the call for clearer language is that constitutional law is simply too complicated to explain in terms that the
non-lawyer can understand. But, as noted earlier, in the not too distant past the Court managed to write many significant opinions in a
very comprehensible style.88 Unintelligible constitutional law is a relatively recent development. It is all the more unfortunate that for the
most part, the worst offenses occur in the Court's opinions in areas of
general public interest such as abortion regulation, affirmative action,
regulation of speech on public property and restriction of religious
symbols on public property.
Perhaps there nonetheless remains some reason for hope. The
portion of the significant joint opinion in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey
that explained why the Court would not overrule Roe v. Wade was written in a very clear and non-technical style. 89 It seems obvious that
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter made a deliberate effort in
that closely watched case to speak to the American people directly. To
a large extent, Justice Kennedy followed the same straightforward approach in his opinion for the Court in Lee v. Weisman,90 the school
graduation prayer case. Hopefully, this trend will continue in other
important cases in the future.
Sometimes, the legal and factual issues in a case will be quite
complicated and a proper decision will require a relatively complex
discussion. Professor Goldstein identifies a way in which the Court
could decide and explain such a case properly and still render its
opinion intelligible to the public at large. In his discussion of Bakke,
he notes thatJustice Powell read a statement from the bench, not incorporated in his opinion, which explained the complexities of the
86

Id. at 112 (quotingJAEs WILSON, A LErra OF AUGUST 24, 1791 FROM A DELE aTE

TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TO THE SPEAKER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REP-

RESENTATrVES, reprintedin THE WoRxS OFJAMES WILSON 62 (PL McCloskey ed. 1967).
87
See generally NAGEL, supra note 2; Bloom, supra note 3.

88
89

90

See supra notes 13-20.
112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-16 (1992).
112 S. Ct. 2649, 2652-61 (1992).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:885

decision more clearly than anything in the opinion itself.9 1 In a case
like Bakke involving lengthy discussions of the appropriate legal standards and state justifications along with several overlapping concurring and dissenting opinions, the Court could include a summary of
its decision and reasoning for the lay reader devoid of the lengthy
consideration of authority that would follow.
The same technique would be especially appropriate in factually
complex abortion regulation cases such as Webster or Casey. As Professor Goldstein recognizes, since the Court's authority is grounded in
public consent, the summary fulfilling its obligation to explain its decisions should be a part of the authoritative opinion written by the
Court and not a mere non-binding syllabus prepared by the reporter
of decisions. 92 It is possible that conflicts and inconsistencies would
arise between the summary and the more analytical sections, but this
possibility alone should not deter such a practice. Such conflicts already occasionally arise when the Court restates its holding somewhat
differently in the course of a lengthy opinion. 93 The courts manage to
interpret these holdings in later opinions. If the task of explaining
Supreme Court decisions in understandable language seems too imposing to handle, this alone suggests that there is something seriously
wrong with the Court's decisiomaking process.
Professor Goldstein's second canon requires the Court to "[w] rite
with candor and clarity."94 As developed in his discussion of Brown II,
this is a call for the explanation of "the 'real' and significant reasons
underlying the decision."9 5 Within limits, this is certainly a desirable
goal. The canon of candor compliments the canon of simplicity since
nothing is gained from a comprehensible explanation if it is dishonest. Throughout the Court's history, dissenting justices as well as academic critics have charged that opinions with which they disagree are
less than candid, if not intellectually dishonest 96 Many of them cersupra note 1, at 98-102.

91

GoLuSrEIN,

92

Id. at 98, 104.

93
See, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2747 (1992) (ScaliaJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out that the Court used two different and arguably inconsistent tests to analyze the issue).

94 GoIuSTrIN, supra note 1, at 114. See generally David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial
Candor,100 HARv. L. REv. 731 (1987).

95

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 115.

96 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 410, 537-60 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (charging that the plurality is effectively overruling Roe though
purporting not to do so); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
455-60 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
Court applies a higher standard of review than it is willing to acknowledge); United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928-60 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (charging that the Court
deliberately misstates the costs and benefits of a limited good faith exception to the exclusionary rule); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242, 253 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court used precedent disingenuously to render a very result oriented decision);
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tainly are, yet candor with regard to the legal rationale of an opinion
is not objectively verifiable. It is almost axiomatic that any reasonably
challenging legal decision can be explained by a variety of rationales. 9 7 In PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,98 the joint opinion argued that
its undue burden standard remained true to the core holding of Roe v.
Wade. The concurring and dissenting opinions maintained that the
joint opinion's rejection of the three trimester framework narrowed
Roe significantly.9 9 Neither position is necessarily disingenuous for a
credible argument could be made in support of either. And yet if the
critic is convinced that one position is clearly correct and the other is
clearly erroneous, he could easily conclude that proponents of the
alternative must recognize its logical flaws, especially after they have
been revealed by the dissenting opinion or the critic. From that conclusion, the charge of intellectual dishonesty flows readily even
though there may be nothing more than a vigorously contested good
faith disagreement on a difficult issue.
Counseling justices to be candid will not resolve this type of conflict. Hopefully, this is not what Professor Goldstein has in mind.
Rather, he is apparently focusing on the case, such as he perceives
Brown H to be, in which the Court deliberately conceals something of
significance in its explanation. Ideally, candor in judicial reasoning
would seem to be very desirable policy. But as in the case of Brown 11,
there will be instances in which it will be difficult, if not impossible,
for the Court to candidly explain all of the underlying aspects of its
decision without undermining it at the same time.
The Court's opinion in United States v. Nixon'0 0 was widely criticized for lack of candor. Critics maintained that the Court was less
deferential to the assertion of Presidential privilege than it should or
ordinarily would have been because it suspected that the President
could not be expected to impartially evaluate the competing interests
given his own involvement and interest. 0 1 But the Court could not
express such a sentiment, either out of respect for the Presidency or
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 520 (1975) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (alleging that the Court

construed the elements of standing narrowly due to an unstated hostility to the merits of
the case).
97 See, e.g, EDWARD H. Lm, AN INTRODUCnON TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); RONALD
Dwomu, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-149 (1978); RONALD DwOnxxN, LAw's EMPIRE 379-92
(1986); MARK V. TusHNET, RED, WHrE AND BLUE: A CRmCAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTrr'TIONAL

LAw 47-57 (1988).
98 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820-2821 (1992).
99 Id. at 2847-50 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 283941 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

100

418 U.S. 683 (1974).

101 See Louis Henkin, Executive Pyivilege: Mr. Nixon Loses But the Presidency Largely
Prevails,22 UCLA L. REv. 40, 45-46 (1974); Philip B. Kurland, United States v. Nixon: Who
Killed Cock Robin, 22 UCLA L. REv. 68, 74-75 (1974); Paul J. Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft
Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REv. 76, 76-78 (1974).
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for fear of prejudicing a potential impeachment proceeding. Thus,
the consensus maintains, the opinion did not truly explain the basis of
the Court's decision.
If candor is the goal, then what should the Court do in a case
such as Nixon? Professor Kurland argued one alternative at the time.
He would have had the Court dismiss the case as nonjusticiable to
avoid the embarrassment of an inadequately reasoned opinion. 10 2 Another alternative would favor candor at all costs, and explain that the
Court would of necessity be less deferential to the President when he
or his close associates were implicated. While this approach might be
more honest, it would not necessarily be prudent. Finally, in the hard
case like Nixon, the Court could simply pull its punches as it apparently did and attempt to be candid when it could afford to do so. As
much as I admire judicial candor and clarity, I would not demand that
the Court strive to achieve these values without regard for the
consequences.
There is another facet of candor in Supreme Court opinions that
I do find quite disturbing: candor with respect to the record. A regular reader of Supreme Court opinions can't help but notice fairly persistent disagreements among the justices regarding the facts of a case.
Allegations that opinion writers have omitted key facts, relied on facts
that are not in the record or lifted important facts out of context have
become commonplace.' 0 3 Indeed, it often seems that the primary differences between the majority and the dissent in many significant constitutional cases has less to do with the law than with the facts. As with
disputes about the legal rationale or the implications of the decision,
some of this is doubtlessly good faith disagreement. Judicial records
are not free of ambiguity. Moreover, to some extent it is simply a
permissible element of the judge's craft to emphasize certain facts and
Kurland, supra note 101, at 74.
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2682-83 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(charging that the Court based its decision on a distortion of the record); New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2435-38 (1992) (White,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (alleging that the Court omitted key facts with respect to the enactment of the
legislation at issue); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 378-81 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (alleging that the record does not support the majority's assertion that the police
relied on specified criteria in conducting an inventory search); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 278 n.5, 297-99 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality and Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing as to whether material "lodged" with the Court should be considered to
provide a showing of past discrimination); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 at n.73, 77475 at n.5 (1984) (disagreement between O'Connor and Brennan as to whether the petitioner's complaint alleged that desegregation order could be undermined if enough discriminatory private schools were receiving tax credits); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,
674-77 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's entire decision is based
on a false factual assumption); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 664,
679, 685, 687, 694-96 (1981) (disagreement between Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Brennan as to the state of the district court's findings and the relevance of various facts).
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ignore others. At some point, however, skillful lawyering begins to
shade into disingenuousness.
Deliberate misuse of the record is particularly troublesome since
it will generally be more difficult and time consuming for the reader
to detect and evaluate. At least the professionally trained reader with
access to a law library can review relevant precedents and statutes and
draw an independent conclusion. As a practical matter, all but the
most dedicated scholar must rely on the Court's statement of the facts.
Moreover, allegations of factual manipulation by the Court should
certainly be a cause for concern considering that the Court itself, as
well as the legal profession, places a very heavy premium on candor
with respect to the record.1 0 4 If the reader concludes that the Court
cannot be trusted to set forth the facts in a relatively objective manner, the integrity ofjudicial review itself is seriously undermined. Ultimately, as Professor Goldstein recognizes, a Court which makes a
good faith attempt to explain its reasoning and decisions openly and
honestly will earn far greater respect from the legal profession and the
public than one that is perceived to be manipulative and devious.
Professor Goldstein's third canon requires that the Court
"[a] cknowledge and explain deliberate ambiguity." 10 5 He recognizes
that due to the collaborative process of building a majority and the
evolutionary aspect ofjudicial reasoning, ambiguity will often be unavoidable. 10 6 But " [c]andor requires that ambiguity be unambiguously
acknowledged" so that the public is able to understand the basis on
which the judgment rests. 10 7 As a general rule, this makes sense in
that almost any attempt to build greater clarity and comprehensibility
into Supreme Court opinions should be welcome. As Professor Goldstein recognizes, ajustice may occasionally use deliberate ambiguity in
an opinion to build or maintain a majority. Ideally, the justices joining in the opinion should attempt to clarify their differences and emphasize the common ground, but sometimes this may be unattainable.
In that event, Professor Goldstein seems to prefer that the justices go
their separate ways and produce a plurality opinion with a concurrence rather than a potentially misleading majority opinion. 10 8 This is
104

The Model Rules provide that
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;

MODEL
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(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of
the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel ....
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuar Rule 3.3 (1983).
GoLusEiN, supra note 1, at 116.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117-19.

Id. at 32.
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certainly a defensible position and if the justices took it seriously perhaps they would succeed in ironing out their differences and produce
even clearer and more principled majority opinions. On the other
hand, it might result in an increase in plurality opinions in significant
cases. As noted previously, the recent Supreme Court can be justly
criticized for its inability to produce majority opinions. At least in areas where guidance is important, the public might well be better off
with more deliberately ambiguous majority opinions and less plurality
opinions in the hope that the ambiguity can be subsequently clarified.
Neither alternative, however, is ideal and each contributes to the present unintelligibility of constitutional law.
Deliberate ambiguity may also be used in an attempt to preserve
flexibility with respect to unforeseen future applications. Professor
Goldstein would not object to this as long as the Court explained what
it was doing. This seems reasonable, however it is likely that justices
will rarely be inclined to emphasize ambiguity in their opinions since
clarity is a well accepted ideal in most expository writing and hence a
deliberately ambiguous judicial opinion will be subject to obvious criticism. Alert critics like Professor Goldstein, however, will make it difficult for the Court to successfully pursue such a strategy of concealed
ambiguity.
The fourth canon of comprehensibility is "[b] e accurate and scrupulously fair in making attributions to another opinion in the case." 10 9
During the past few decades, characterizations of other opinions by
the justices have grown more caustic, exaggerated and personal. 110
Professor Glendon has observed that "the justificatory reasoning of
American Supreme Court judges" results in a style in which "[t] he'
Id. at 119.
110 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2853-54 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (overwrought criticism of ChiefJustice Rehn109

quist's opinion); Id. at 2873-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (scathing and sarcastic attack on the reasoning of the joint opinions); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.
Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (charging that majority is exercising
"[p] ower, not reason" and "inviting... [an] open defiance of our precedents"); Webster v.
Reproductive Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 532-37 (1989) (ScaliaJ., concurring) (attacking Justice
O'Connor's unwillingness to overrule Roe v. Wade); Id. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accusing the plurality of bad faith and intellectual
dishonesty); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Sert., 489 U.S. 189, 212
(1989) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (emotional critique comparing the Court to "antebellum
judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves"); City of Richmond v.J. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,
528 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of being disingenuous and
manipulative); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 n.27, 682 n.3,
697 n.8, 700 n.10, 703 n.13 (1981) (quarrelsome footnotes between Justices Brennan &
Rehnquist); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 601 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (referring to portions of one of the Court's earlier opinions as "graffiti");
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856-80 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(submitting an extraordinarily shrill and bombastic dissent).
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Court's ruling is made to appear almost inevitable: the winner's position entirely vindicated, the loser's thoroughly discredited." '
This uncompromising, confrontational approach which characterizes social interaction well beyond Supreme Court opinions encourages the type of overstatement and misrepresentation to which
Professor Goldstein and others quite rightly object." 2 As noted earlier, partisan exaggeration of this nature does not tend to fool the
professional reader but may very well confuse the lay audience for
whom the Court should be writing. Obviously, no bright line separates legitimate criticism from unfair exaggeration. One effective
method of critiquing an opinion is to speculate about its potential
implications. Whether such speculation constitutes either fair logical
progression or rhetorical hyperbole will often depend on whether the
reader agrees with the result. Carried to an extreme, this constant
bickering and misstatement may detract from the reputation of the
Court.
Professor Goldstein's final canon of comprehensibility is
"[i] ncorporate in the text, rather than relegate to footnotes, material
that is directly related to the reasons for the decision or to the meanu 3 This is yet another common sense
ing or breadth of the holding.""
way by which the Court can ensure that it is including the non-legally
trained in its audience. As a corollary, I would suggest that the Court
should relegate a far higher percentage of the legal citations, quotations and cross references which presently clutter the text of its opinions to the footnotes. This material, which is often important, would
remain in the opinion for the professional reader and anyone else
who might be interested but would not pose such an obstacle for the
ordinary citizen.
In order to implement these canons, Professor Goldstein recommends that the justices hold a final-review conference to ensure the
candor and accuracy of their opinions. Of course, all of the suggestions for improving the intelligibility of the Court's opinions are entirely academic unless the Court as a whole desires to move in that
direction. Perhaps the most obvious objection to requiring such a
conference for each case would be the crush of time. Given that a
large percentage of the Court's most significant decisions are not
completed and released until the last week or two of the term, it
111 GLENDON, supranote 21, at 154. For further criticism of this type of squabbling see
Arnold C. Johnson, Supreme Court Sound and Fuiy, LEGAL TiMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at 30;
BrendaJones Quick, Whatever Happened to RespectfulDissent?,A.B.A.J.,June 1991, at 62; The
Court at the Millennium-A Conversation,A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 62-66 (comments of Professors Stephen Carter and Mark Tushnet).
112
See GLENDON, supra note 21; Robert Nagel, The Supreme Court's Bad Language,WALL
ST. J., Feb. 17, 1993, at A15.
113 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 121.
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would probably be impossible for the justices to sit down and carefully
scrutinize and discuss as many as a dozen lengthy and difficult cases at
the very point at which they are attempting to bring the term to a
close. The Court would probably need to alter its present publication
schedule, and there is obviously some question as to whether it could.
Moreover, it would be naive to believe that such conferences could
resolve all of the problems that Professor Goldstein identifies. In
many instances, it is likely that the justices would be unable even to
agree on whether there were problems in need of resolution. The
inability to achieve perfection, however, should hardly deter attempts
at improvement.
As my responses to these case studies indicate, the type of intelligibility that I would demand of the Court is arguably more modest
than that sought by Professor Goldstein. I believe that in order to
provide the public with the opportunity to evaluate its decisions and
hopefully continue to consent to its constitutional stewardship, the
Court should write in a style that is accessible to the intelligent but
non-legally trained reader.1 1 4 This would continually remind the
Court of the true source of its authority and would give the citizen a
realistic opportunity to listen to the Court, learn from it and evaluate
its work product. Professor Goldstein would demand at least that
much of the Court, but in addition, like Professor Bickel, he would
insist that the Court's exposition of the Constitution must always be
strictly principled as well. That is certainly a worthy ideal for the
Court to pursue and I generally endorse it. I question, however,
whether it is always attainable in the type of landmark cases that Professor Goldstein discusses.1 15 The Court may not be able tojustify its
decisions in a coherent and professionally satisfying manner in its first
pass at difficult issues. Or, it may encounter the type of obstacles to
candor and principle that were presented in Brown v. Board of Education, Cooper v. Aaron and United States v. Nixon. Usually, the case must
still be decided. Even in these hard and controversial cases however,
the Court can attempt to explain the basis of its decisions in a manner
114

But see Eisgruber, supranote 3, at 1030 for the conclusion that the Court's educative

function often conflicts with its decisional role. As he puts it:
If the people's understanding of the Constitution is defective by comparison to the Court's-as the education metaphor might presuppose-then
one might say that the Court must bring its message down to the level of
the people. This might, in the end, elevate the people. It also risks, however, corrupting the Court (or, at least, the Court's message).
I am not certain that I would agree with Professor Eisgruber as to the frequency and inevitability of this conflict, but I do agree that it occurs, as my prior discussion of Brown Iand
Cooperv. Aaron should indicate. Like Professor Eisgruber and unlike Professor Goldstein, I
am comfortable with some degree of deliberate judicial ambiguity and reticence in such
instances.
115
See generallyTusHNr, supra note 97, at 46.60; Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982).
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that is comprehensible to both the lay and the professional reader. I
doubt that we can expect much more of the Court. Professor Goldstein clearly does.
Professor Goldstein has written a timely, useful and eminently intelligible book. While I disagree with the analysis of several of his
specific case studies, I still believe that I can accept the general principles he propounds. I consider the book, as a whole, to be a particularly valuable contribution to Supreme Court scholarship. I believe
that the Court would be both a more effective and a more respected
institution if the justices read this book and took many of its teachings
to heart.

